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I. INTRODUCTION
Long before the European colonization of America, Native Americans
employed traditional adjudicatory systems to resolve disputes and punish
crimes.' With the invasion of the colonists and the eventual disruption of
tribal cultures, historic methods of tribal dispute resolution irrevocably
changed.' Because tribal mechanisms were not highly formalized, the
colonists mistakenly viewed tribal societies as lawless, though in fact they
were highly ordered, lawful communities where judges held a position of
respect in the tribal hierarchy.3
Indian tribes are recognized by the United States as "distinct, inde-
pendent political communities."4 Their power to self-govern is not seen as
the product of a grant from the federal government, but rather it "flows
from a preexisting sovereignty."5 That sovereignty, though limited, is
recognized and protected by the federal government.6 The existence of
this protectorate relationship does not extinguish tribal sovereignty; "a
weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-gov-
ernment, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection."7 It is
this "essential claim of tribal Indians that distinguishes them from other
groups ... their claim of sovereignty-the inherent right to promulgate
and be governed by their own laws."8 The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that tribal courts play a "vital role in tribal self-govern-
ment."9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Wilson v.
Marchington,1 0 however, presents a dramatic departure from established
notions of tribal self-governance and poses a very real threat to the future
*. J.D., expected 1999, University of Montana, School of Law.
1. FELiX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiAN LAW 230 (1982).
2. Id.
3. Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction Over Federal
Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion/Abstention Doc-
trine, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 531 (Winter 1997).
4. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
5. COHEN, supra note 1, at 231.
6. Id.
7. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61.
8. L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 815 (1996).
9. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978).
10. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1516 (1998).
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of tribal sovereignty itself.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Wilson subverts a long line of judicial
precedent supporting the exercise of tribal inherent and treaty confirmed
judicial jurisdiction in tribal members' reservation based claims against
non-Indian defendants. The Wilson court's jurisdictional analysis was
misguided on at least two fronts. First, in its rigid adherence to the U. S.
Supreme Court's holding in Strate v. A-i Contractors," the Ninth Circuit
misapplied a factually specific holding that tribes lack civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction in a tort action between non-Indian parties arising on a state
highway within Indian country to a distinguishable action brought by an
enrolled tribal member. Second, the Wilson court misapplied the two part
test from Montana v. United States" in finding that the defendant's tor-
tious conduct lacked a sufficient nexus to tribal welfare to justify the tribal
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the wrongful act.
This article first looks to the established law governing the exercise
of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in actions between tribal members
and non-members which arise in Indian country. Part IlI examines the rule
of Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Ninth Circuit's authority for reversing the
longstanding presumption of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indian par-
ties, to an action arising in Indian country brought by a tribal member.
Part IV recaps the facts of Wilson v. Marchington, traces its judicial histo-
ry, and recounts the Ninth Circuit's flawed analysis. Part V critiques the
Ninth Circuit's decision, distinguishing Wilson from Strate, first, by call-
ing attention to the issue of whether the situs of the tort was actually on
alienated tribal land, and second, by offering that Mary Jane Wilson's
injuries did have a demonstrable tribal impact warranting tribal court juris-
diction under Montana's second exception. This article concludes by re-
counting the proper analysis to be undertaken by federal courts in review-
ing jurisdictional challenges.
II. TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
While tribal courts have long been denied criminal jurisdiction over
non-members, 3 tribal civil jurisdiction has historically been much less
restricted. " In fact, the federal government has consistently encouraged
the development of tribal courts to provide a forum for the resolution of
11. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
12. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (requiring either the existence of a consen-
sual relationship between the parties, or conduct directly affecting the economic security, health or
welfare of the tribe before tribal exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on alienated lands
within the reservation is warranted).
13. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
14. COHEN, supra note 1, at 341-42.
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civil disputes. 5
Tribal courts consistently have been seen as the appropriate forum for
the resolution of disputes "affecting important personal and property inter-
ests of both Indians and non-Indians" within the reservation. 6 In Wil-
liams v. Lee, 7 a milepost case addressing tribal civil jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court held that in a civil dispute between an Indian
and a non-Indian arising on a reservation, jurisdiction is properly placed in
the tribal courts. 8 An exercise of state jurisdiction in such a matter
"would undermine the authority of tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of Indians to govern themselves."' 9
The fact that one of the parties is not an Indian is "immaterial" to the
question of determining a proper forum.2"
Furthermore, "[tiribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty" and "[c]ivil
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in tribal courts ....
While there is a presumption that civil adjudicatory jurisdiction is initially
vested in the tribal court, under the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal reme-
dies, the tribal court's assertion of jurisdiction is ultimately subject to
review in federal district court22
Ironically, the erosion of this presumption of tribal retention of civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction began with a dispute over tribal regulatory juris-
diction. In Montana v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court established
a rule limiting a tribe's regulatory jurisdiction over non-member activities
within the boundaries of the reservation.' In Montana, the court ad-
15. See Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994) (allow-
ing tribes to form governments, promulgate constitutions and codes, and establish tribal courts); see
also Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (noting that Congress "has never ex-
pressed any intent to limit the civil jurisdiction of the tribal courts.").
16. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978) (providing federal forum for
claims arising under the Indian Civil Rights Act would be at odds with the congressional goal of pro-
moting tribal autonomy and self-government).
17. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over debt
collection action brought by non-Indian owner of reservation store against tribal members).
18. Id. at 223.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18; See also National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
22. See National Farmer's Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16-19. In
essence, the exhaustion/abstention doctrine requires a federal court to "stay its hand until after the
tribal court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction." The federal court should
further abstain from exercising jurisdiction, regardless of the basis for jurisdiction that might exist, to
permit an exhaustion of tribal remedies as a matter of comity. At a minimum, the exhaustion doctrine
requires appellate review of lower court decisions within the tribal court system before a party can
challenge the tribe's exercise of jurisdiction in federal district court.
23. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544 (establishing presumption that tribes lack civil regulatory juris-
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dressed the specific question of whether the Crow Tribe had the power to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation lands along the Big
Horn River held in fee simple by non-Indians.24 The Crow Tribe based
its claim of jurisdiction on two grounds. First, the Tribe asserted the pow-
er to regulate non-member conduct on the Big Horn under a claim of
ownership to the bed of the river." Second, the Tribe also claimed juris-
diction based on its inherent power as a sovereign. 6
The Court, however, found that neither of the Tribe's arguments
supported their claims for regulatory jurisdiction. First, the Court denied
the Crow Tribe's claim of ownership, 7 and then rejected the claim for
jurisdiction based on retained inherent sovereignty." The Court effective-
ly reversed the established rule that tribes retain powers not expressly
relinquished when it found the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations
is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot sur-
vive without express congressional delegation."'29
Despite creating a presumption that tribes lack regulatory jurisdiction
over non-members on alienated lands, the Montana Court nonetheless
recognized that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on non-Indian fee lands."3 Specifically, the Court stated two excep-
tions to the presumptive denial of tribal civil authority over non-members.
First, "a tribe may regulate.., the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members," and second, a
"tribe may also ... exercise civil authority ... when [non-Indian] conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health and welfare of the tribe."'"
Although determinations of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction con-
tinued to follow Williams v. Lee and its progeny for a decade and a half
after Montana, the Supreme Court recently extended Montana's presump-
tive divestiture of regulatory jurisdiction to tribal exercise of adjudicatory
diction over non-members on alienated lands within the reservation).
24. Id. at 547.
25. Id.; See also id. at 578-80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting treaty language setting reserva-
tion boundary at mid-channel of the river, thus creating understanding that tribal lands included river
bed to mid-channel and all river beds within the reservation's outer boundaries).
26. Id. at 547.
27. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556-57 (excluding the river beds from Crow tribal lands despite clear
treaty language to the contrary in this case began a judicial tradition of determining ownership and
alienation of tribal lands to effectuate the divestiture of tribal civil jurisdiction).
28. Id. at 564-65.
29. Id. at 564.
30. Id. at 565.
31. Id. at 565-66.
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jurisdiction.
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF STRATE V. A-1 CoNTRACTORS
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,32 the U.S. Supreme Court established a
rule denying tribal jurisdiction over a reservation-based claim where nei-
ther party was Indian. This rule has since been misconstrued to diminish
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in suits brought by tribal mem-
bers.33 The issue in Strate was whether the Tribal Court had jurisdiction
to hear a tort suit between two non-tribal members involved in a car acci-
dent on a state highway within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian
reservation.' The Strate Court relied heavily on Montana in finding that
"tribal courts may not entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of
accidents on state highways, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe
to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in question."35
Still, the Strate decision, like Montana before it, recognized that a
tribe retains the right to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members
for acts committed on the reservation, even on alienated fee lands, under
either of two exceptions.36 First, such an exercise of civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians is justified to regulate "activities of nonmem-
bers who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."37
Tribal jurisdiction is further warranted over nonmember conduct "when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. 38
A unanimous Court found that neither of the Montana rule exceptions
applied to the unique facts of Strate.39 Even though A-1 was engaged in
subcontract work for a corporation that was wholly owned by the Three
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold," and was arguably involved in a con-
sensual relationship with the Tribe,4' the Court agreed with the Eighth
Circuit that the underlying dispute was "distinctly non-tribal in nature."42
32. Strate, 520 U.S. at 438. Thus far, Strate is the only post-exhaustion review of tribal civil
jurisdiction case to reach the Supreme Court.
33. See id. at 459-60.
34. I& at 442-44.
35. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
36. Id. at 456 (applying Montana test).
37. Il at 456-57 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
38. IL at 457 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
39. Id. at 459.
40. Il at 443.
41. Id. at 457.
42. Id. (citing Strate, 76 F.3d at 940) (observing that the dispute "arose between two non-Indi-
ans in [a] run-of-the-mill [highway] accident").
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The Court emphasized that A-1 did not fit Montana's first exception
which provides that only those directly contracting with non-Indians will
be afforded jurisdiction over their civil disputes in tribal court.43 In a sim-
ilarly formalistic reading, the Court found that Montana's second excep-
tion did not apply.44 Still the Strate Court unabashedly conceded that
"those who drive carelessly through a reservation endanger all in the vi-
cinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. 45 Yet the
Court refused to apply the exception to this dispute between non-Indians
for fear that it "would severely shrink the rule" insulating non-Indians
from tribal court jurisdiction. 6
Thus, the Strate Court, in a narrow application of the Montana rule,
denied tribal jurisdiction in a tort case where both parties were non-Indi-
ans and the cause of action arose on a state highway within the reserva-
tion.47 Although the granting instrument conveyed a mere "easement for a
right-of-way" to North Dakota, the Court nonetheless found this convey-
ance of a non-possessory interest transformed the right-of-way into the
"equivalent... [of] alienated, non-Indian land"48 within the boundaries
of the reservation. Still, despite this strained construction of the concept of
alienation, the Strate decision acknowledged tribal jurisdiction over such
disputes when a statute or treaty authorizes the tribe to govern nonmember
conduct.49
IV. THE WILSON V. MARCHINGTON DECISION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the restrictive rule of
Strate, a factually specific holding, to a very different set of facts in Wil-
son v. Marchington ° The court immediately stated Wilson's principal
distinguishing factual difference from Strate-that Mary Jane Wilson, the
tribal court plaintiff, was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe. 1
While recognizing this fact, the court proceeded to apply an expansive
reading of the Strate holding, interpreting Strate as governing jurisdiction
over a tort claim between a non-Indian and an Indian. 2 The Ninth
Circuit's decision in this case breaks with a long line of precedent holding
that jurisdiction of such disputes is properly placed in the tribal courts. 3
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 443.
48. Id. at 455-56.
49. Id.
50. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 805; facts are set forth infra at notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 807.
52. Id. at 813.
53. The Ninth Circuit has regularly held that civil jurisdiction over an action between Indian
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A. Facts of the Case
Mary Jane Wilson's tort cause of action against Thomas David
Marchington and Inland Empire Shows, Inc., had its genesis in an auto-
mobile/truck collision that occurred east of Browning, Montana, within the
exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation.' At the time of
the accident, and at all times thereafter, Wilson was an enrolled member
of the Blackfeet Tribe while Marchington was not.55
On July 17, 1989, Wilson was driving her car on U.S. Highway 2
through the Blackfeet Indian Reservation.56 Marchington was driving an
Inland Empire semi-tractor trailer close behind her.57 Wilson, while still
preceding Marchington on the highway, signaled to make a left turn on to
a side road." Marchington, either in ignorance or disregard of Wilson's
intent to turn off the highway, attempted to pass her on the left and collid-
ed with her car as she exited the highway.59
These are the facts as stated by the district and appellate courts." In
fact, the only significant factual dispute rests in Wilson's contention that
the accident did not occur on the highway right-of-way.6' The U.S. Dis-
trict Court, however, found that the accident occurred on U.S. Highway
2.62 The Ninth Circuit reviewed that finding for clear error and upheld
the District Court, noting that the State's right-of-way does not end at the
edge of the pavement and that the facts as found in the Tribal court fur-
ther supported that finding.63
B. Prior Judicial History
The parties tried this case before a jury in the Blackfeet Tribal Court
beginning on June 16, 1992.4 At trial, Marchington and co-defendant
Inland Empire specifically reserved the right to contest all jurisdictional
and non-Indian parties arising within the boundaries of a reservation was within the tribal courts. See,
e.g., Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994); Crawford v. Genuine Parts, 947 F.2d 1405 (9th
Cir. 1991); Wellman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987); A.&A. Concrete, Inc. v.
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986).
54. See Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (D. Mont. 1995), rev'd, 127 F.3d
805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Appellee's Opening Brief to 9th Cir. at 16-17, Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9'
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-35145).
62. Wilson, 934 F. Supp. at 1184.
63. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 814.
64. Appellee's Opening Brief to 9' Cir. at 2, Wilson (No. 96-35145).
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issues in federal court.65 The jury entered judgment in favor of Wilson,
finding Marchington liable for causing the collision and awarding damages
of $246,100.66
Both parties appealed the Tribal court judgment to the Blackfeet Trib-
al Court of Appeals, and, on August 19, 1993, that court affirmed the
Tribal court judgment on the issue of liability but reversed on damages
and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages alone.67 The Tribal ap-
pellate court declined to find the Blackfeet Tribal Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the appellants.68
Both parties then appealed to the Blackfeet Supreme Court.6 9 On
July 1, 1994, a panel of three justices reversed the Tribal court of appeals
and reinstated the original judgment in its entirety." Again, the Blackfeet
Supreme Court dismissed arguments that the Tribal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.7'
Wilson then sought registration and recognition of the Tribal court
judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Montana,
Great Falls Division. 2 The district court concluded that the facts of Wil-
son fit neither of the Montana rule exceptions that would allow the Tribe
to assert jurisdiction over the non-tribal member defendants. 3 Still, some-
what confusingly, the court adopted a test requiring that a valid tribal
interest must be at stake before a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdic-
tion over a non-Indian or nonmember, but once the tribal interest is estab-
lished, a presumption arises that tribal courts have jurisdiction over the
non-Indian or nonmember unless that jurisdiction is affirmatively limited
by federal law.74
Thus, while expressly stating that neither the Montana rule's "consen-
sual agreement" nor the "direct effect" exception applied to this case, and
that a valid tribal interest was not at stake, the court mysteriously came to
the contradictory conclusion that the Tribal court had jurisdiction.75 The
court then recognized the judgment of the Tribal court on November 8,
65. Appellant's Opening Brief to 9th Cir. at 5, Wilson (No. 96-35145).
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id.
72. Wilson, 934 F. Supp. at 1178.
73. Id. at 1185.
74. Id. at 1184 (citing A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 1994 WL 666051, at *9 (8' Cir. Nov. 29,
1994) (Hansen, J., dissenting), vacated, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), aft'd, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)).
75. Id. at 1185-87 (following the questionably reasoned Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
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C. Issue Presented to the Ninth Circuit
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the "ques-
tion of whether, and under what circumstances, a tribal court tort judgment
is entitled to recognition in the United States Courts."'
D. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
The Ninth Circuit's analysis began with a discussion of the proper
basis for enforcing a tribal court judgment in federal court, devoting con-
siderable attention to the whether a tribal court judgment should be hon-
ored on the basis of comity or full faith and credit.78 Wilson argued that
the Blackfeet Tribal Court's judgment deserved recognition under the
implementing legislation of the United States Constitution's Full Faith and
Credit Clause.79 Marchington summarily challenged Wilson's argu-
ment."0 The law is arguably clear that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not apply to enforcement of tribal court judgments, but rather applies
only to the states." While it is true that Congress has expressly extended
full faith and credit to tribal court decisions on a selective basis, the Ninth
Circuit made it clear that Congress had not intended a blanket application
of the doctrine. 2 While acknowledging that "there are policy reasons
which could support an extension of full faith and credit to Indian tribes,"
the Ninth Circuit recognized such an extension was properly "within the
province of Congress or the states, not this Court."83
After thus disposing of Wilson's full faith and credit argument, the
court not surprisingly stated that "the recognition and enforcement of tribal
judgments in federal court must rest on the principles of comity."" Co-
mity is the recognition that one nation allows "to the legislative, executive,
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws." 5 While the court recognized
76. Id. at 1187.
77. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807.
78. Id. at 807-09.
79. Id. at 808; See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
80. Id. at 808; Counsel for Marchington and Inland Empire devoted less than ten lines of their
50 page opening brief to rebuff Wilson's full faith and credit argument. Appellant's Opening Brief to
9 ' Cir. at 43-44, Wilson (No. 96-35145).
81. Id. at 808; See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
82. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808.
83. Wilson, 127 F.3d. at 809.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 810 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
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that their status as "dependent domestic nations" places tribes in "unique
circumstances," it nonetheless stated that comity still provided the "best
general analytical framework for recognizing tribal judgments."86 Thus,
the court approached enforcement of the Blackfeet Tribal Court judgment
as it would the legal judgment of any other nation. Relying on the law of
foreign relations, the court concluded that "as a general principle, federal
courts should recognize and enforce tribal judgments."87
After enunciating this pro-enforcement stance, the court proceeded to
qualify its support of tribal court jurisprudence. The court enumerated two
mandatory and four discretionary grounds for non-recognition of tribal
court judgments.88 Federal courts are prohibited from enforcing tribal
judgments if:
(1) the tribal court did not have both personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion; or (2) the defendant was not afforded due process of law. In addi-
tion, a federal court may, in its discretion, decline to recognize and en-
force a tribal judgment on equitable grounds, including the following
circumstances: (1) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (2) the judgment
conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; (3)
the judgment is inconsistent with the parties' contractual choice of fo-
rum; or (4) recognition of the judgment.., is against the public policy
of the United States or the forum state in which recognition of the judg-
ment is sought.89
After elaborating on these grounds for non-recognition, 9 the court dis-
missed Marchington's argument that reciprocity of recognition of judg-
ments should be yet another mandatory prerequisite to recognition of tribal
court judgments.9 1
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 482 (1986) (cited by the Ninth Circuit as grounds for either barring or weighing against enforcement
of a tribal court judgment).
89. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810. Counsel for Marchington and Inland Empire contended that the
tribal court clearly erred or abused its discretion on a number of evidentiary issues to the prejudice of
defendants. Appellant's Opening Brief to 9' Cir. at 6-10 & 35-40, Wilson (No. 96-35145). Defendants
also contended that a justice on the Blackfeet Supreme Court should have disqualified himself because
he regularly practiced before the court and might benefit from a ruling counter to the jurisdictional
arguments raised by the defendants. Id. at 10-11. Though defendants argued the court impaired their
right to present a defense, they never specifically raised the issue of denial of due process. Though
such arguments would no doubt have failed, one wonders if the cumulative effect of the alleged abuses
of the tribal courts could have influenced the Ninth Circuit's decision.
90. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (recognizing that due process does not require the tribe to use
identical judicial procedures as U.S. courts so long as defendants are afforded "the basic tenets of due
process").
91. Id. at 812. While the court again deferred to the executive and legislative branches to de-
cide the reciprocity question, it is curious that Marchington would raise such an argument since Black-
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Marchington's argument that recognition of tribal court judgments
requires application of state rather than federal law92 was similarly dis-
missed." The court recognized that the "quintessentially federal character
of Native American law, coupled with the imperative of consistency in
federal recognition of tribal court judgments, by necessity require that the
ultimate decision governing the recognition and enforcement of a tribal
judgment by the United States be founded on federal law."'94
Having settled upon the applicable analysis based on comity, the
court promptly stated that the judgment from the Blackfeet Courts was
"not entitled to recognition or enforcement because the tribal court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction."95 Admittedly, the court's jurisdictional analy-
sis was "commanded by Strate v. A-1 Contractors."96 Rigidly applying
the Strate rule, the Wilson court held that "tribal courts may not entertain
claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways,
absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of
nonmembers on the highway in question."
97
As the Strate Court had previously found regarding the North Dakota
highway of that case,9" the Wilson court concluded that the right-of-way
for U.S. Highway 2 on the Blackfeet Reservation was the equivalent of
alienated non-Indian land." The court further stated, in simplistic fashion,
that U.S. Highway 2 on the Blackfeet Reservation was "similar in all
relevant aspects to the highway in Strate.' 'Ire The court began
analogizing the Strate and Wilson highways by noting that both rights-of-
way were granted pursuant to statutory authority.'' In Wilson, the grant-
ing statute authorized the Secretary of the Interior "to grant permis-
sion.., to the proper State or local authorities for the opening and estab-
lishment of public highways in accordance with the laws of the State...
through any Indian reservation .... ."" Thus the court found that, as in
Strate, the right-of-way had been granted, and effectively alienated, "pur-
feet Ordinance No. 81, Chapter 5, § 1 provides full faith and credit to other tribal and state court judg-
ments in Blackfeet courts.
92. Appellant's Opening Brief to 9' Cir. at 44-45, Wilson (No. 96-35145) (comparing en-
forcement of judgment to actions arising under federal diversity jurisdiction where the court would
apply the law of the forum state).
93. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 442).
98. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 454.
99. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 311 (1994)).
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suant to a federal statute."'
0 3
The court further analogized the highway in Wilson to the highway in
Strate by claiming the Blackfeet Nation had similarly consented to the
right-of-way grant by treaty."° To conclude the "alienated land" analogy,
the court noted that the public had unrestricted access to both U.S. High-
way 2 and the North Dakota highway in Strate.'0 5 The Ninth Circuit thus
concluded the analogy by stating:
[T]his case mirrors the case of Strate almost precisely: it was an automo-
bile accident between two individuals on a United States highway de-
signed, built, and maintained by the State of Montana, with no statute or
treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the
highway. The tribe had consented to construction of the road to which
the general public had unlimited access."
The court then settled the major factual dispute in the case by upholding
the U.S. District Court's finding that the accident had occurred on the
right-of-way of the highway.
1 0 7
Although Strate "commanded" the jurisdictional analysis, the court
did grant cursory consideration to the applicability of the Montana rule
exceptions whereby the tribal court might still have jurisdiction over the
dispute.0 8 Since the defendants had clearly not entered into any consen-
sual relationship with the tribe, the court focused on the second Montana
exception. The issue for the court thus became whether "a traffic accident
injuring a tribal member sufficiently affects the economic security, politi-
cal integrity, or health and welfare of the tribe, thus satisfying the second
Montana exception."'
Here again, the court devoutly followed Strate in rendering a literal
interpretation of what conduct "affects" the tribe. The court reiterated
Justice Ginsburg's concession in Strate that a careless driver on a reserva-
tion "endanger[s] all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize[s] the safety of
tribal members," but found that this threat alone is insufficient tribal im-
pact to warrant tribal civil jurisdiction under the exception."' The Ninth
Circuit found the availability of "plain, speedy, and adequate remedies" in
103. Id. at 814.
104. Id. (citing Treaty with the Blackfeet Nation, October 17, 1855, U.S.-Blackfeet Nation, art.
8, 11 Stat. 867, wherein the tribe did "consent and agree" that "the United States may ... construct
roads of every description" through tribal lands).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id., see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 814-15 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-59).
109. Id. at 814.
110. Id.
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state or federal courts obviated the need for tribal remedies for the acts of
non-member tortfeasors."'
V. CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH Cmcurr's DECISION
Although the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wilson v. Marchington
strictly adhered to the Supreme Court's Strate holding, it is nonetheless a
highly questionable application of that rule. At the very least, the court
should have confined the Strate holding to its unique facts-a tort claim
arising on a highway between non-Indian parties. However, by expanding
the Strate rule to the facts of Wilson, the Ninth Circuit has struck a blow
at tribal self-governance and sovereignty by denying tribal court jurisdic-
tion over a reservation-based action brought by a tribal member.
This section begins with a brief examination of the comity-based
analysis for enforcing tribal court judgments and a summation of the rec-
oncilable jurisdictional rules of Strate v. A-1 Contractors, Williams v. Lee,
and their progeny. More importantly, this section proceeds to question the
application of the Strate and Montana rules to Wilson's distinguishable set
of facts. It then questions the Ninth Circuit's finding that U.S. Highway 2
on the Blackfeet Reservation was "similar in all relevant aspects to the
highway in Strate." Next, the Ninth Circuit's finding that Wilson's injury
lacked sufficient impact on tribal health and welfare to warrant jurisdiction
under Montana's second exception is 'challenged. Finally, this section
looks to Strate's first basis for the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over a
non-Indian, i.e., whether Wilson could have claimed there were statutory
grounds for the Blackfeet Tribal Court's retention of jurisdiction over this
dispute.
A. The Framework for Enforcing Tribal Judgments
Although many see the extension of full faith and credit as the solu-
tion to the debate over tribal jurisdiction,'12 the court's rejection of
Wilson's argument is not without support."' While the policy arguments
for such an extension are strong, the Wilson court properly deferred to
Congress on this matter." 4 Furthermore, placing tribal courts in the same
111. Id at 815.
112. See, e.g., Diana B. Garoznik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts From a Federal Courts
Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY LJ. 723 (1996); but
see Gordon K. Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1414
(1985) (providing a good discussion of opposition to full faith and credit enforcement; noting percep-
tions of tribal courts' lack of competence, inadequate appellate procedure, and procedural irregular-
ities).
113. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808-09; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (providing full faith and
credit should be applied to the acts of "states, territories and possessions").
114. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 384-85; Garoznik, supra note 112, at 741-44 (noting congres-
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position as state or territorial courts seems to lend itself to a further ero-
sion of tribal sovereignty and judicial independence. So despite its many
weaknesses," 5 comity remains the federal courts' accepted analysis for
granting recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments." 6 That
the tribal court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction is a mandatory
prerequisite to enforcement." 7
The specific rule that emerges from Strate is that a tribe presumptive-
ly lacks jurisdiction over suits brought by non-members against non-mem-
bers for torts committed on alienated lands, unless: 1) there is statutory
authorization for tribal jurisdiction, or 2) the non-member had entered a
consensual relationship with the wronged party, or 3) the non-member's
acts had a demonstrably serious impact on the political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare of the collective tribe."8 If, however, the
Strate rule is confined to application on similar facts, as its narrow fram-
ing of the issue would dictate," 9 there is no conflict with the established
rule that a tribe can exercise jurisdiction over a non-member for a tort
committed upon a tribal member within Indian country. 2 °
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, could have easily distinguished Wilson
from Strate on the basis of Mary Jane Wilson's status as an enrolled
member of the Blackfeet Tribe, 2 ' thus upholding the established juris-
dictional rule of Williams v. Lee and confining the Strate rule to disputes
between non-Indians. Instead, the court ignored the fact that Wilson's trib-
al membership distinguished her from Gisela Fredericks, the plaintiff in
Strate,'22 and endowed her with the something "more"'2 which the
sional extension of full faith and credit on ad hoc basis as evidencing Congress's intent to limit broad-
er application).
115. See Wright. supra note 112, at 1410-11 (noting that comity is discretionary, inconsistent in
application, and is not available as a matter of right).
116. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 809.
117. Id. at 810; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 482 (1986).
118. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813-15.
119. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 443 (revealing a fact specific framing of the issue which emphasized
that neither party was a member of the tribe).
120. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18; National Farmers Union, 471
U.S. at 856-57.
121. Compare Strate, 520 U.S. at 443 (establishing plaintiff Fredericks, a widow of a tribal
member and mother of five adult children who were tribal members, was not herself a member).
122. Compare Wilson with Montana v. Bremner, 971 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Mont. 1997)
(finding injury to a tribal member directly affected tribal welfare in a way it could not have in Strate,
where the injured party was a nonmember, thus bringing the action under Montana's second excep-
tion); but see Austin's Express, Inc. v. Arneson, 996 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D. Mont. 1998) (following
Wilson's reading of Montana and Strate in denying Crow Tribal Court jurisdiction over tort action
arising from death of tribal member struck by nonmember's truck on the right of way to Interstate 90
within reservation boundaries).
123. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 814 (Justice Ginsburg observed that "those who drive carelessly ...
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court suggested that she needed-a demonstrable tribal impact-to warrant
jurisdiction under Montana's second exception.
B. The Indian Lands Question
Despite the Ninth Circuit's pronouncement that U.S. Highway 2 was
"similar in all relevant aspects to the highway in Strate,"'' 4 the highways
are arguably distinguishable. In fact, Wilson's claim that the tribal court
had jurisdiction was largely based either on the premise that the accident
occurred off of the highway on Indian land, or in the alternative, that the
highway on the Blackfeet Reservation was not alienated land."z The
question is critical to the jurisdictional analysis, yet because the tribal
courts reasonably presumed Wilson's tribal membership sufficient to war-
rant jurisdiction, the courts below conducted only a superficial analysis of
the question.
Historically, Indian judicial and substantive law exclusively applied
on all land, whether alienated or not, within a reservation's bound-
aries."as In fact the statutory definition of "Indian country" does not dis-
tinguish land by ownership or use, but rather includes "all land within the
limits of any reservation... including rights-of-way running through the
reservation."' 7 Congress's purpose in so broadly defining Indian country
was to create one jurisdictional unit, thus avoiding "an impractical pattern
of checkerboard jurisdiction" requiring a '.'search of tract books in order to
determine jurisdiction."'" Yet despite the clear statutory language that
rights-of-way remain a part of Indian country, the Ninth Circuit has
treated a statutory taking of a highway easement in Wilson'29 the same as
a voluntary alienation of the land for just compensation, as was the case in
jeopardize the safety of all tribal members" while cautioning that "if Montana's second exception
requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.") (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58).
124. Id. at 813.
125. Appellee's Opening Brief to 9th Cir. at 16-18, Wilson (No. 96-35145); Appelee's Supple-
mental Brief Regarding Strate v. A-1 Contractors at 3-11, Wilson (No. 96-35145). The Supreme Court
issued the Strate opinion while Wilson's case was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Despite the presence
of the Strate holding, counsel for Wilson reiterated the non-alienated land arguments mentioned above,
rather than addressing the requirements of the Strate rule. While Wilson argued effectively to distin-
guish her factual case from Strate, that argument failed.
126. EUGENE F. ScOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 11.19 (Lawyer's ed. 1984).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Though a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 also applies to civil
actions. See DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, n.2 (1975); see generally COHEN, supra
note 1, at 27-47; but see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154(c) & 1156 (1994) (excluding rights of way from Indian
country in sections governing dispensation and possession of alcohol).
128. See SCOLES, supra note 126, n.2 (citing Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. Penitentiary,
368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962)).
129. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813-14 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 311 which authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to grant permission to state authorities for the opening and establishment of public highways
through any Indian reservation).
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Strate.30 Neither the Strate nor Wilson courts even considered whether
the tribes in either case had conveyed, or surrendered, a possessory inter-
est in their lands or merely a right of passage. Instead, these courts have
relied on an unusual construction of property law aligning the right-of-way
with "land alienated to non-indians"'' to divest tribes of their traditional
geography-based jurisdiction over Indian country. 3 2 Without the conve-
nience of this strained construction of alienation, the courts' Montana
analyses simply would not apply.
Although the land beneath U.S. Highway 2 had been taken for a
right-of-way, it was still arguably tribal land.'33 Even the Strate Court
recognized "that tribes retain considerable control over nonmember con-
duct on tribal land."'34 Thus, if the U.S. Highway 2 right-of-way is
merely an easement on tribal land, as Wilson argued, jurisdiction of a tort
suit between an Indian and a non-Indian arising thereon presumptively
remains with the tribal court.'35
The Ninth Circuit, however, has chosen to view a statutory taking of
a right-of-way as it.would a consensual alienation of a possessory interest
in the land. The court's conception of alienation makes for reckless prop-
erty law. By emphasizing the restraint on the Tribe's ability to exclude
travelers from the right-of-way,'36 the court was able to equate a grant of
a right-of-way to an alienation in fee. Thus, if the Secretary of the Interior
takes a right-of-way for a highway in Indian country, the tribe cannot
restrict public access; and if the tribe cannot restrict public access, they
cannot exercise jurisdiction over non-members, even for acts on tribal
land. This rationale is not only circular and self-serving, it is an overt
assault on tribal sovereignty.
130. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-57 (compare the consensual statutory grant with compensation pur-
suant to 25 U.S.C. § 323-28 to the taking of a right of way pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 311 in Wilson
which does not require tribal consent nor compensation).
131. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454.
132. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
133. Under generally established rules of property law governing highway rights of way, the
public merely acquires an easement of passage with the fee title to the land beneath the right of way
remaining in the landowner. See, e.g., Harris v. Elliot, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 25 (1836); Bailey v. Ravalli
County, 653 P.2d 139 (Mont. 1982).
134. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454.
135. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 257; see also Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (upholding tribal
regulatory jurisdiction over non-members on tribal land).
136. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 252; see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 688-89
(1993) (emphasizing tribe's ability to exclude non-members is a pivotal factor in exercise of regulatory
jurisdiction over alienated lands).
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C. Applicability of the Second Montana Exception
By ruling that U.S. Highway 2 lay on the equivalent of alienated
land, the court left Wilson but two options to validate the tribal court's
jurisdiction over her claim. Since no consensual relationship existed, there
either had to be statutory grounds for jurisdiction or a demonstrably seri-
ous impact on the political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare of the tribe.
Yet from the rules laid down in Strate and Wilson, we can surmise
that nothing short of a cataclysmic event will satisfy the second Montana
exception. Justice Ginsburg's pronouncement in Strate that "those who
drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endan-
ger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal mem-
bers,"'37 but do not have a significant impact on tribal health and wel-
fare, is at best incongruous. At worst, it is a statement of extraordinary
cultural myopia and insensitivity.
Justice Ginsburg's failure to detect a direct effect on tribal health and
welfare ignores the unique nature of reservation social structures, and
instead imposes a main-stream American perception of what effects the
community. Tribal cultures are rooted in communal values where "family
denotes extensive kinship networks that reach far beyond the Western
nuclear family. It is a multi-generational complex of people and clan and
kinship responsibilities [internal punctuation omitted]."'38 The function of
tribal society as a whole relies upon this extended family structure of the
clan and the interrelationships and mutual obligations which it fosters.'39
In such a culture, injury to one arguably affects the welfare of the whole
by disrupting the social structure at a fundamental level. The fabric of a
close-knit reservation community can be torn apart by an injury to one
member with extensive kinship ties.
Justice Ginsburg's comments further overlook the dramatic impact
that an accident involving one tribal member can have on the availability
of health services for others in the community. The Indian Health Service
(IHS), the primary source of health care in most reservation communities,
is notoriously under-funded, and precious health care resources expended
to care for tortious injuries compromise care for other tribal members."4
137. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58.
138. Lorie M. Graham, "The Past Never Vanishes": A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indi-
an Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5 (1998-99) (citing VINE DELORIA, INDIAN EDUCA-
TION IN AMERICA 22 (1991)).
139. Id. at 6.
140. See, e.g., William Boyum, Health Care: An Overview of the Indian Health Service, 14 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 241, 253-63 (1990) (observing that fixed funding for reservation health care often
results in shortages and the inability of IHS to offer a full range of services which provide needed care
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Since IHS funds are disbursed to reservations in fixed annual allocations, a
severe injury to one tribal member can have far-reaching consequences on
availability of health care for the rest of the tribe. 4 ' Quite simply, if one
tribal member suffers injuries that drain a Tribe's IHS budget, other tribal
members are rationed care, or forced to go without.
Justice Ginsburg also neglected a Tribe's interest in hearing claims
arising from automobile accidents within the reservation. Indians have
historically experienced a death rate from accidents over three times that
of the nation as a whole. 4 With such an alarmingly high mortality rate
from accidents, a tribe certainly has a valid interest in governing the con-
duct of non-members that might further add to that toll.
Yet if the court defines tribal impact from a detached Western per-
spective, it can find that conduct which endangers and injures tribal mem-
bers does not affect the tribe. The absurdity is all too apparent. Cultural
ignorance is not a prerequisite of comity, and in fact is antithetical to a
doctrine based on respect for another's culture.
The court's fears that applying Montana's second exception to the
facts of the Wilson and Marchington accident "would severely shrink the
rule"'43 has effectively eliminated the exception. The result is a "shrink-
ing" of the rule-the rule that a tribe can provide its members a remedy
against tortious conduct by a non-member. The rule that emerges is that a
tribe can no longer govern the conduct of non-Indian tortfeasors when
their torts are committed on public highways."4 Tribes are thus denied
the deterrent effect which enforcement of tort judgments has on threats to
the health and safety of members. This obviously infringes on the interest
tribes have in protecting its members by extending its laws to non-mem-
bers and thus diminishes the Tribe's sovereignty itself.'45
to many members).
141. See, e.g., Judith Nygren, Council to Address Issues Facing Indians Health Care Among
Priorities at National Meeting of Governors' Interstate Indian Council Conference, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Aug. 17, 1997, at lb (noting a forced rationing of health services on the Santee Sioux Reser-
vation where health care funding for the reservation of 1,100 members totaled $190,000 for Contract
Health Services from off-reservation care providers, and one member's medical bills amounted to
$73,000).
142. Boyum, supra note 140, at 247 (documenting an Indian mortality rate from accidents over
three times the national average during the 1970's).
143. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 814-15 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 458).
144. See Phillip Allen White, Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on the
Good Roads, and You've Got Nothing to Worry About, " 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65 (1997).
145. Compare with DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 139-40 (1965) (recogniz-
ing that "[o]ur territorially organized governments undertake by means of laws and regulations govern-
ing conduct ... to safeguard the health and safety of people and property within their bounds." Cavers
warns that "[t]his system of physical and financial protection would be impaired if a person who en-
ters the territory of a state were not subject to its laws ... ").
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D. Absent a Statute or Treaty?
In its blind adherence to the Supreme Court's articulation of the
Strate holding,146 the Ninth Circuit followed the Court's analysis of tribal
jurisdiction as established in Montana v. United States.147 Even if we ig-
nore Wilson's tribal membership and concede that the accident in Wilson
did not sufficiently impact tribal interests, we have to question whether
Strate's provision for tribal jurisdiction over a non-member by "statute or
treaty" applies.1
48
The Ninth Circuit did not address this question for one reason; it was
never raised. After the Supreme Court issued the Strate opinion, the par-
ties in Wilson were directed to submit supplemental briefs addressing
Strate.149 While the Strate Court made plain that jurisdiction over a non-
member could be retained by a provision in a treaty or statute, Wilson
never presented an argument on this point.' Such an argument could
have been raised,"' and Wilson might have prevailed by presenting stat-
utory grounds for tribal retention of jurisdiction.
The Strate Court noted that the North Dakota state court should have
jurisdiction over that action because neither party was Indian and the
accident occurred on a state highway. Although the Ninth Circuit used the
Strate rule to deny Wilson a forum in the Blackfeet tribal court, A-1 Con-
tractors conceded the propriety of tribal adjudication of disputes like
Wilson's in their principal argument "that tribal jurisdiction is only present
if at least one of the parties is a member of the tribe." ' Ironically, A-1
Contractors' argument to exclude that case from tribal jurisdiction supports
Wilson's case for Blackfeet tribal court jurisdiction over her tort claim.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit stated that tribal interests in the political
integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe are not
diminished if Wilson were forced to bring her claim in state or federal
court.
153
The Ninth Circuit echoed Justice Ginsburg's observation in Strate
that "neither regulatory nor adjudicatory jurisdiction over the state high-
way accident is needed to preserve the right of reservation Indians to
146. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
147. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544.
148. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813-14 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 443); see also Montana, 450 U.S. at
565.
149. The parties submitted supplemental briefs on May 20, 1997.
150. See Appellee's Supplemental Brief Regarding Strate v. A-1 Contractors, Wilson (No. 96-
35145) (failing to raise statutory grounds for jurisdiction).
151. See 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994) (requiring tribal consent to a state's assumption of jurisdiction
over civil causes of actions to which Indians are parties).
152. A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 1992 WL 696330, at *2 (D.N.D. Sept. 17, 1992).
153. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 815.
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make their own laws and be ruled by them .... Opening the Tribal Court
for [the plaintiffs] optional use is not necessary to protect tribal self-gov-
ernment."' 54 In this unquestioning adherence to Strate, the Ninth Circuit
erred. Although in Strate, the North Dakota court had concurrent jurisdic-
tion over that action, Montana courts are not similarly situated. In fact,
Montana courts lack jurisdiction over civil actions involving a tribal mem-
ber, like Wilson, that arise within the Blackfeet Reservation because nei-
ther the state nor the tribe have taken the necessary steps to vest jurisdic-
tion over reservation-based tort claims in the state courts.15
5
In Kennerly v. District Court, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
Blackfeet Nation has not effectively consented to state assumption of
concurrent civil adjudicatory jurisdiction.5 6 Like Williams v. Lee,
Kennerly originated as an action by a merchant to collect payment for a
debt which arose on private land within the exterior boundaries of a res-
ervation. The merchant brought the action in the Montana state district
court, and the debtors, who were members of the Blackfeet tribe, moved
to dismiss, claiming the state court lacked jurisdiction because the defen-
dants were tribal members and the transactions took place on the reserva-
tion.'57 After failing on this motion in the state court, the U.S. Supreme
Court accepted the Blackfeet defendants' petition for certiorari.
The Court's examination of the law governing state assumption of
civil jurisdiction over disputes arising in Indian country revealed that the
Blackfeet have retained this important sovereign power. The Court was
faced with an unusual situation in Kennerly, however, because the Black-
feet Tribal Council had adopted a resolution submitting the tribal court to
concurrent jurisdiction with state courts in all suits wherein the defendant
is a tribal member.'58 The Montana Supreme Court relied heavily on this
resolution for the assertion of state civil jurisdiction over the action."'
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, found the resolution insufficient to
divest the tribe of jurisdiction because it failed to meet the requirements
for tribal consent prescribed by federal law."W
The federal statute governing state assumption of civil jurisdiction
states:
154. Id.
155. See Kennerly v. District Ct. of Mont., 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (holding Montana had not met
the statutory requirements for state assumption of civil jurisdiction over an action arising within Indian
country where an Indian is a party).
156. Id. at 429 (holding resolution of tribal council insufficient to vest state with jurisdiction
within the Blackfeet Indian Nation).
157. Id. at 424.
158. Id. at 425 (citing Chapter 2, Civil Action, § 1 of the Blackfeet Tribal Law and Order Code,
(1967)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 429.
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The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not having
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indi-
ans are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within
such State to assume, with the consent of the tribe .... such measure of
jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action arising within such
Indian country ... 161
The code also prescribes that tribal consent based on a majority vote of
enrolled members is a prerequisite for state assumption of jurisdiction over
civil actions described in this statute." The Kennerly Court went on to
find that the resolution of the tribal council conferring concurrent jurisdic-
tion on the state court did "not comport with the explicit requirements of
the Act" because the council acted unilaterally without submitting the res-
olution to a vote of tribal members. 63 Thus, the Court found the resolu-
tion of the Blackfeet Tribal Council was not sufficient to vest jurisdiction
over a civil action to which an Indian was a party in the state courts.
Similarly, Montana has not assumed civil or criminal jurisdiction over
the Blackfeet reservation by "affirmative legislative action."'" Although
Montana exercised its option under this act to acquire civil jurisdiction
over Indians of the Flathead Reservation, it never took such action regard-
ing the Blackfeet People." Montana simply has not extended the state's
civil jurisdiction on to the Blackfeet Reservation by legislative act, nor has
the Blackfeet Tribe consented to state assumption of jurisdiction. Corre-
spondingly, federal district courts cannot assume diversity jurisdiction if
the state court lacks jurisdiction, because "federal courts sitting in diversity
operate solely as adjuncts to the state court system.""e As a result, Wil-
son did not have the optional forum in state court available to the peti-
tioner in Strate, and, as a result, jurisdiction of her claim lies exclusively
in the tribal court.
Thus, Wilson's tort claim in the tribal court system was not an "op-
tional use" of that system as Gisela Fredericks' was in Strate. The Black-
feet Nation has retained civil jurisdiction over actions such as
Wilson's-actions arising on the reservation with a tribal member as a
party-through both the state's and tribe's failure to take the necessary
161. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1994).
162. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994) (prescribing the means by which a tribe may consent to a volun-
tary divestiture of its jurisdiction raises interesting questions regarding the federal government's right
to thus interfere with a tribe's exercise of its sovereignty, even in an act in which the tribe would
relinquish a degree of that sovereignty).
163. Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 429.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 425.
166. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 13.
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steps to extend its jurisdiction onto the Blackfeet Reservation. Although
the issue was not raised, 167 there was, in fact a statutory basis for the
tribe to hear this dispute in the absence of assumption of jurisdiction by
the state. With this statutory authorization, the court's Strate analysis
would have been unnecessary, and Wilson could have satisfied Strate's
first requirement for tribal jurisdiction over this matter. 68 Unfortunately,
it appears that neither the parties, nor the court, knew the applicable law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wilson v. Marchington does not create
good law. In its adherence to Strate v. A-] Contractors, a case which
applied Montana v. United States' civil regulatory jurisdiction analysis to
determine civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in a suit between two non-tribal
members, the Ninth Circuit wrongly extended Strate's fact-specific hold-
ing to deny tribal jurisdiction over civil suits arising in Indian country
where an Indian is a party. The court easily could have distinguished this
case from Strate either on the basis of Mary Jane Wilson's tribal member-
ship or on the basis of the highway remaining a part of Indian country.
Furthermore, a careful reading of the relevant law would have allowed the
court to determine that the state of Montana does not have jurisdiction
over the Blackfeet Reservation. Instead the Ninth Circuit has created a rule
that divests tribal courts of civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members for
torts committed on highways or public access lands.
In addition, the Supreme Court's ruling in Strate should not be fur-
ther applied without carefully considering whether: 1) either of the liti-
gants are Indian, 2) the situs of the claim is actually alienated non-Indian
land, and 3) the state has assumed jurisdiction over civil actions to which
Indians are parties. In the future, courts should realize that determinations
of "the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sover-
eignty has been altered, divested, or diminished [citations omitted], as well
as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as em-
bodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial deci-
sions."'69
Claimants in tribal courts, and the tribal courts themselves, should be
prepared to defend the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over non-
167. See Addendum to Appellant's Opening Brief, Wilson (No. 96-35145). Curiously, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1322 was before the court from the beginning of the appeal, although neither party asserted the
statute as controlling the determination of jurisdiction in the text of their arguments.
168. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813-15 (noting absence of jurisdictional authorization by statute or
treaty); see also Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
169. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 855-56.
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members in federal court as a result of the Strate and Wilson decisions.
No longer will the courts assume that jurisdiction over such matters pre-
sumptively lies in the tribal court forum. Tribal court claimants thus face
the additional burden of establishing a record which supports the propriety
of their choice of forum. Claimants can avoid the result of Wilson by
clearly establishing that their cause of action arose on non-alienated land,
or by establishing a direct effect on the tribe. Most importantly, parties in
the tribal court system should familiarize themselves with the applicable
federal law and be prepared to raise a statutory basis for tribal retention of
jurisdiction.
The Wilson opinion indicates the danger of making law when neither
the parties nor the court conduct the kind of "careful examination" which
it demands. The kind of simplification, or disregard, of the law that denied
Mary Jane Wilson her chosen forum benefits nobody. It serves only to
further diminish tribal sovereignty and burden the already strained resourc-
es of state and federal court systems. The sad result of this lengthy juris-
dictional battle has been to leave Mary Jane Wilson without a remedy for
her injuries for over eight years. Surely, tribal members pursuing a lawful
remedy within the tribal courts deserve better from the federal courts.
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